Abstract

In his seminal work on the political economy of dictatorship, Ronald Wintrobe (1998) posited the existence of a "dictator’s dilemma," in which repression leaves an autocrat less secure by reducing information about discontent. We explore the nature and resolution of this dilemma with a formalization that builds on recent work in the political economy of nondemocracy. When the regime is sufficiently repressive, and the dictator’s popularity correspondingly unclear to opposition as well as autocrat, the ruler faces two unattractive options: he can mobilize the repressive apparatus, even though there may be no threat to his rule, or he can refrain from mobilizing, even though the threat may be real. Semicompetitive elections can ease the dilemma through the controlled revelation of discontent. Depending on the ease of building a repressive apparatus, autocrats who manage information in this way may prefer more or less repression than Wintrobe’s dilemma alone implies.